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Abstract: Culture’s role in cognition has long been established, but understanding national culture’s role in cyber events 
currently remains an understudied research area. Michael Minkov observed that culture influences thought; even when 
people think they are in control, cultural biases are actually controlling their thoughts. Cultural values endure, and because 
they do, these cultural values leave artifacts can be revealed in thought patterns. This philosophy serves as a foundation for 
further work in progress on name choices by hackers. In this study, we examined 10 years’ worth of Zone-H archives where 
hacker names that identified with national identities were analysed using Hofstede’s cultural framework to determine 
whether culture may play a role in hacker name and name choices. The findings revealed cultural preferences in several of 
the six cultural dimensions. In addition, trending the results showed significant findings in two cultural dimensions: (1) 
masculinity versus femininity and (2) uncertainty avoidance. The results suggest that assumptions about the anonymous 
nature of the Internet influencing behaviours may not be universally applicable, and that culture should also be considered 
when evaluating cyber actor behaviours. 
Keywords: Hofstede, culture, online names, cultural dimensions 
1. Introduction
Geert Hofstede said, “Culture is everything” (2010). Hofstede’s statement supported Minkov’s observation that 
even when people think that they are making free choices, those choices are actually being influenced by cultural 
values (2013). Culture impacts the behaviour of individuals and groups, shaping the social environment (e.g., 
traditions) (Rozin, 2003). Morgan, Cross, and Rendell (2015) observed the influence of culture when setting 
behavioural norms in learning tasks. Meanwhile, Nisbett (2010) noted culture’s influence on linguistics and, 
more generally, how humans process information (holistic versus analytic cognition). 
Nisbett (2010) also observed that, culturally speaking; the world is literally viewed differently by people based 
on their national country of origin and corresponding environmental factors and social norms. Support of these 
different views comes from many sources including the following: Guess 2004; Guss and Dorner, 2011; Henrich, 
Hein and Norenzayan 2010; and Nisbett 2010. Evidence for culture’s role in thoughts, choices, and behaviours 
allows for the study of all aspects of cyber behaviours and choices and their underlying motivations. Choices and 
motivations range from attack vectors, messaging, and even the attacker name or name handle. We hypothesize 
that these decisions are, in part, shaped by culture. To investigate this hypothesis, we examined the relationships 
amongst a framework for cultural values and a list of hacker groups. In particular, we assessed the frequency of 
occurrence where hacker group names included a reference to their home country with the hacker’s cultural 
values.  
2. Literature review
Elmasry, Auter, and Peuchaud (2014) used Hofstede’s framework to compare Arab and East Asian cultures for 
evidence of cultural preferences when constructing online Facebook identities. Elmasry et al. (2014) noted high 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI), masculine, and collectivist preferences. Sample and Karamanian (2014) also used 
Hofstede’s framework to identify user cultural preferences associated with Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter 
users. Sample and Karamanian (2015) noticed different adoption rates based on egalitarian values, collectivism, 
masculinity, and indulgence.   
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Sample and Karamanian (2015) also examined patriotic and political website defacements where they noted 
strong authoritarian, collectivist, and restrained values associated with political and patriotic defacements. 
Furthermore, Sample (2015) correlated authoritarianism, masculinity, and restraint with defacements as a 
political, patriotic, or revenge response to physical or kinetic events in the geopolitical realm. Because social 
media usage varies by culture (Sample and Karamanian, 2014), and online identity construction in social media 
shows cultural preferences (Elmasry et al., 2014), a reasonable assumption might be that cultural markers may 
be present in defacer handles or names. 
 
Hofstede’s cultural framework, while widely adopted, has been criticized in the past (McSweeney, 2002, 
Baskerville, 2003; Baskerville-Morley, 2005).  Some criticisms (McSweeney, 2002) have claimed that the use of 
national cutlures as a framework is too broad.  Other criticisms noted that the original survey focused on 
engineers; thus, did not represent a cross-section of the larger society that comprises a nation (McSweeney, 
2002).  These criticisims may merit further examination, but they do not detract from the resaerchers goal of 
using a cultural framework for exploring patterns of cyber behaviors (Sample, Cowley, Watson & Maple, 2016).  
Explanations of behaviors rely on a mix of anthropologic resources.  Finally, no single cultural framework has 
been adopted by anthropologists.  The values identified in Hofstede’s cultural framework are consistent with 
values found in other cultural frameworks, thus; Hofstede’s framework is well-suited for the purpose of this 
study. 
 
Hofstede’s framework defines national culture for six dimensions; power distance index (PDI), individualism 
versus collectivism (IvC), masculinity versus femininity (MvF), UAI, long-term orientation versus short-term 
orientation (LvS), and indulgence versus restraint (IvR). Country values are scored on a scale of 0 to 100. A brief 
explanation of the dimensions follows. 
2.1 Power Distance Index 
PDI measures the level to which society members feel comfortable with an unequal distribution of power 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). Countries with low PDI scores tend to be egalitarian. Countries with high PDI scores tend 
to be authoritarian. 
2.2 Individualism versus Collectivism 
IvC measures the role of the community and family in the decision-making process (Hofstede et al., 2010). Low 
IvC countries are collectivist and decisions are made based on their impact to the community. High IvC countries 
are individualist and decisions are made based on what is best for the individual or may extend to the family. 
2.3 Masculinity versus Femininity 
MvF measures gender roles and the response to aggression versus nurturing. Countries with low MvF scores are 
feminine and consider nurturing the citizens, and these countries typically prefer negotiation to confrontation 
when dealing with aggressive behaviours (Hofstede et al., 2010). Countries with high MvF scores deal forcefully 
with aggressive behaviours and gender roles are clearly defined. 
2.4 Uncertainty Avoidance 
UAI measures the societal comfort with the new or unknown (Hofstede et al., 2010). Many, if not most, cultures 
are uncomfortable or even fearful of the unknown, and this level of fear constitutes the high end of the UAI 
measures. Low UAI societies view the unknown as a curiosity and seek to understand the unknown. 
2.5 Long-Term orientation versus Short-Term orientation 
LvS measures the outlook of societal members in terms of instant or delayed gratification (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Short-term oriented societies comprise the low end of the dimensional pole, and these societies are known for 
making decision based on immediate impact. Long-term oriented societies make up the high end of the 
dimension, and decisions are made based on the long-term outcome. In a long-term oriented society, initial 
losses are tolerated because eventually the long-term outcome will far exceed the initial losses. Holism is 
associated with long-term orientation (Hofstede et al., 2010). 
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2.6 Indulgence versus Restraint 
IvR measures how open or tolerant a society is (Hofstede et al., 2010). Restrained societies are oftentimes 
referred to as closed societies, and these societies comprise the low end of the dimensional pole. Indulgent or 
open societies make up the high end of the dimensional pole. 
 
This study focused on hacker names that include either the country name or the name used to define citizens 
(e.g., France, French). This study also represents the early findings of a larger work in progress, which will 
examine cultural values with names and motivations. The brief nature of this paper requires a more limited 
scope, which may serve as a foundation for the larger work in progress. 
3. Methods 
Minkov (2013) indicated that culture can be independently studied; thus, cultural values and behaviours can be 
studied separately from the individual. Furthermore, when studying culture, Van der Vijver and Leung (1997) 
noted the difficulty in separating out cultural biases in studies. Morgan et al., (2015) said that the behaviour of 
the group or community affects the behaviour of the individual. Thus, cultural influences can occur 
simultaneously with subjects, analysts, and researchers; therefore, controls for bias must be applied to all actors. 
The role of the researcher’s cultural biases must be identified and mitigated because cultural biases of the 
researcher have the potential to appear when evaluating others (Fiske and Taylor, 2013; Almeshahd and 
Spafford, 2014). The quantitative nature of this study serves as a guard to mitigate or reduce biases, partially 
due to the objective nature of quantitative analysis (Van der Vijver and Leung, 1997). The researchers 
acknowledge that no solution is perfect and the potential exists for some biases to remain. 
 
The Zone-H (www.zone-h.org) archive of website defacements provided the raw, unbiased observation data 
used for the study. The 10-year analysis was performed by comparing median values for actors for individual 
years and then the combined 10-year period. The sampling frame was Hofstede’s cultural values for the 100 
evaluated countries. The countries that were represented by hackers using a reference to the country in their 
name were compared against the remaining countries from Hofstede’s list of 100. This division creates two 
distinct groups for comparison: one group of countries that uses national terms in their name, and a second 
unrelated group that is taken from the same sampling frame that have an Internet presence but no evidence of 
groups using nationally themed names when defacing websites.   
 
The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test was used to compare two unrelated groups, the defacers versus the 
non-defacers, to determine if the groups that are being compared are statistically similar or different (Hollander, 
Wolfe, and Chicken, 2013).t. If a single hacker culture exists, then, cultrually speaking, there should be no 
difference between the self-named hackers and the non-hackers. The test will be run for each of the six cultural 
dimensions, and the findings will be used to determine whether the two groups are similar or different (Ibid). 
The results are measured in the probability of randomly obtaining the findings and are evaluated using the 5% 
rule (Ibid). The MWW test was chosen due to the non-parametric nature of the data distribution (Ibid).   
 
The findings for each of the years of data show individual moments in time. The combination of the data from 
all of the years produces a very broad output that may result in certain changes or trends being missed. 
Therefore, a trend analysis will be performed over the 10-year interval. The trend analysis will rely on median 
values of the attacker group over each of the six dimensions tracked over the 10-year period, and a trend analysis 
was performed using a Spearman correlation (Hauke and Kossowki, 2011). 
 
The testing was performed assuming the null hypothesis, and although each hypothesis decomposed into sub-
tests for each of the six dimensions, the entire 10-year interval was also examined. The trend test was performed 
to determine whether longer term patterns might exist. Therefore, yearly MWW tests and the Spearman 
correlation (Hollander et al, 2013) tests were done. The null hypothesis stated that each group was statistically 
the same, meaning that their distributions are the same. This can be represented as H0: H2 F(t) = G(t).  
 
The location shift model will represent the alternative hypothesis, H1, H3 (Hollander et al, 2013). Computing the 
MWW relies on ordering the values from least to greatest (Ibid), then summing the values. S1 is the rank of the 
Y1 and Sn is the rank of Y, thus the following equation applies. 
G(t) = F(t-Δ) 
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HN: There exists no statistical relationship between culture and hacker names that indicate national 
origin over the combined 10-year interval. 
H01…06: There exists no statistical relationship between (PDI, IvC, MvF, UAI, LvS, or IvR) values and 
hacker names that indicate national origin over the combined 10-year interval. 
H1: There exists a statistical relationship between culture and hacker names that indicate national 
origin over the combined 10-year interval. 
H11…16: There exists a statistical relationship between (PDI, IvC, MvF, UAI, LvS, or IvR) values and 
hacker names that indicate national origin over the combined 10-year interval. 
Rejection of the H0 requires one or more dimensions being statistically different measured to the 5% rule. The 
second set of hypotheses tests rely on examination of the individual years. This test was performed to determine 
whether any potentially observable findings were random one-time events or whether the findings occurred 
more frequently, which would be suggestive of persistent cultural values. Rejection of H2 would require that any 
dimension show statistical differences measured to the 5% rule for 3 or more years. Three or more years were 
chosen to deal with the dynamic nature of the growth of the Internet. These analyses were exploratory, with a 
focus on effect sizes, so no adjustment was made for multiple comparisons. 
H2: There exists no statistical relationship between culture and hacker names that indicate national 
origin over the 10-year interval. 
H21…26: There exits no statistical relationship between (PDI, IvC, MvF, UAI, LvS, or IvR) values and 
hacker names that indicate national origin over the 10-year interval. 
H3: There exits a statistical relationship between culture and hacker names that indicate national 
origin over the 10-year interval. 
H31…36: There exits a statistical relationship between (PDI, IvR, MvF, UAI, LvS, or IvR) values and 
hacker names that indicate national origin over the combined 10-year interval. 
The third set of hypotheses tests uses the Spearman correlation. This is the non-parametric equivalent to the 
Pearson correlation (Hollander et al., 2013). The Spearman correlation is calculated as follows: 
rs= (rs – E0(rs))/{var0(rs)}1/2 
H4: There are no statistical trends by culture with hacker names over the 10-year interval. 
H41…46: There are no statistical trends by (PDI, IvR, MvF, UAI, LvS, or IvR) values with hacker names 
that indicate national origin over the 10-year interval. 
H5: There are statistical trends by culture with hacker names that indicate national origin over the 
10-year interval. 
H51..56: There are statistical trends by (PDI, IvR, MvF, UAI, LvS, or IvR) values with hacker names that 
indicate national origin over the combined 10-year interval. 
The yearly results will be evaluated, and a simple majority in any dimension results in a rejction of the null 
hypothesis. However, for this initial foray, a less stringent threshold will be considered or three or more years 
of significant findings. This relaxed standard is considered because the research is exploratory and due to 
Cohen’s (1988) observation of type II errors when evaluating humans. In recognition of the growth patterns of 
Internet adoption rates over the past decade, this initial study does not account for the changing growth 
dynamics. Furthermore, there were no adjustments to p-values after multiple comparisons because this work is 
investigative and we focused on effect sizes for significant associations. 
4. Results 
The combined list of actors who used their country name or referenced the term for citizens in their handle 
consisted of 45 countries over the 10-year period. A complete list of all of the countries values can be found at 
Hofstede’s website (http://geerthofstede.nl/dimension-data-matrix). Table 1 contains the list of countries and 
their dimensional scores.   
     n 
W = Σ Sj 
             j=1 
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Table 1: Hofstede values for countries with national named attackers 
Country PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR 
Albania 90 20 80 70 61 15 
Bangladesh 80 20 55 60 47 20 
Brazil 69 38 49 76 44 59 
Bulgaria 70 30 40 85 69 16 
Chile 63 23 28 86 31 68 
Colombia 67 13 64 80 13 83 
Croatia 73 33 40 80 58 33 
Denmark 18 74 16 23 35 70 
Country PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR 
Ecuador 78 8 63 67 NA NA 
Egypt 70 25 45 80 7 4 
France 68 71 43 86 63 48 
Germany 35 67 66 65 83 40 
Greece 60 35 57 100 45 50 
India 77 48 56 40 51 26 
Indonesia 78 14 46 48 62 38 
Iran 58 41 43 59 14 40 
Iraq 95 30 70 85 25 17 
Israel 13 54 47 81 38 NA 
Italy 50 76 70 75 61 30 
Jordan 70 30 45 65 16 43 
Kuwait 90 25 40 80 NA NA 
Libya 80 38 52 68 23 34 
Malaysia 100 26 50 36 41 57 
Mexico 81 30 69 82 24 97 
Morocco 70 46 53 68 14 25 
Netherlands 38 80 14 53 67 68 
Nigeria 80 30 60 55 13 84 
Pakistan 55 14 50 70 50 0 
Peru 64 16 42 87 25 46 
Philippines 94 32 64 44 27 42 
Poland 68 60 64 93 38 29 
Russia 93 39 36 95 81 20 
Saudi Arabia 95 25 60 80 36 52 
Serbia 86 25 43 92 52 28 
Spain 57 51 42 86 48 44 
Sri Lanka 80 35 10 45 45 NA 
Switzerland 34 68 70 58 74 78 
Syria 80 35 52 60 30 NA 
Turkey 66 37 45 85 49 49 
UK 35 89 66 35 51 69 
Venezuela 81 12 73 76 16 100 
Table 2 contains the results of the 10-year comparison between the national named attackers countries and the 
countries that did not have national named attackers. Tests for statistically significant differences at the 5% 
(0.05) value or less are considered successful for difference, and the results are displayed in bold. Test results 
that are between 5% and 10% are displayed in italic. The 5% to 10% values are determined to be of interest 
because (1) human behaviour is being measured and (2) Cohen (1988) observed an increase in the type II error 
when testing human behaviour to the 5% rule. As the work progresses, these areas of interest will be further 
examined. 
Table 2: Comparison between national named attackers and other countries without national named attackers 
(H0, H1) 
Dimension PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR 
p value 0.18 0.89 0.04 0.04 0.73 0.41 
The findings for the H0 and H1 hypothesis/alternative hypothesis test showed statistical significance for 2 of the 
6 dimensions: MvF and UAI. The results of the test would lead to rejection of H03 and H04 and acceptance of the 
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alternative hypothesis H13 and H14. Hypotheses H01, H02, H05, and H06 should be accepted. Overall, H0 will be 
rejected and H1 accepted. 
Table 3: Yearly comparisons between national named attackers and other countries without national named 
attackers (H2, H3): p values are rounded to the 2nd decimal place 
Dimension/ 
Year 
PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR N 
2005 0.02 0.75 0.11 0.07 0.72 0.18 15 
2006 0.28 0.31 0.13 0.00* 0.63 0.13 17 
2007 0.39 0.37 0.14 0.00 ** 0.79 0.34 15 
2008 0.34 0.85 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.92 12 
        
2009 0.03 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.10 15 
2010 0.02 0.66 0.18 0.08 0.64 0.36 16 
2011 0.16 0.88 0.79 0.16 0.57 0.08 20 
2012 0.04 0.62 0.00 *** 0.29 0.13 0.75 24 
2013 0.00 
**** 
0.32 0.01 0.42 0.12 0.13 23 
2014 0.00 
***** 
0.38 0.01 0.34 0.55 0.09 25 
The results in Table 3 showed differences in 3 of 6 dimensions: PDI, MvF, and UAI. These differences would lead 
to rejection of H21, H23, and H24 resulting in the acceptance of H31, H33, and H34. Ultimately, H2 is rejected and H3 
is accepted. An interesting observation is the MvF activity of the group, which becomes increasingly masculine 
in the later years, and the high UAI results in the early years. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the Spearman’s correlations over 10 years. Median scores were entered for each 
dimension during the 10-year period; the year was the x-variable and the cultural dimension score represented 
the y-variable. Results were evaluated using Cohen’s effects size (1988). Cohen’s effects size is used for 
evaluating human behaviours and resulted from high incidence of type 2 errors when evaluating human 
behaviour to the 5% rule. Cohen (Ibid) set the following ranges for evaluating r: 0.1–0.3 indicates a weak 
correlation, 0.3–0.5 indicates a moderate correlation, and ≥0.5 indicates a strong correlation (Ibid). For this 
study, moderate and strong correlations are consistent with rejction of the null hypothesis H4 and acceptance 
of the alternative hypothesis H5.  
Table 4: Ten-Year trends in national named attackers 
Dimension PDI IvC MvF UAI LvS IvR 
R 0.24 −0.62 −0.27 −0.81 −0.34 −0.54 
Evaluation Weak Strong Weak Strong Moderate Strong 
The findings in Table 4 showed strong negative correlations for IvC, UAI, and IvR. Thus, over time, the national 
named countries were increasingly more collectivist in nature, lower in UAI, and increasingly restrained. The 
moderate correlation between short-term orientation and national names countries is also noted. H42, H44, and 
H46 are rejected, whereas H52, H54, and H56 are accepted. Therefore, H4 is rejected and H5 is accepted. 
5. Discussion 
The findings from the three groups of tests were in somewhat anticipated based on earlier study results. The 
slightly high power distance and high masculinity seen in the MvF dimension were anticipated, and in other 
cases, such as the high UAI findings, the results were unanticipated. The link with patriotism and defacing was 
initially established by Sample (2013) and reinforced by Sample (2015), so the association with authoritarianism 
is not surprising, particularly when considering the national pride associated with the name selection. The 
masculinity is also of interest because of the direct and aggressive behaviour, suggesting that violence against 
the victim is also a masculine trait. This pattern emerged as the number of participating countries began a strong 
increase starting in 2009. In general, the number of attacks also increased during that same time period as more 
countries continued to establish their online presence. 
 
The first test relied on collecting all of the names used over the 10-year interval. There were 44 countries 
represented over the 10-year interval. The group of 44 countries was compared to the remaining group of 55 
countries. The results showed that the national named actors were more masculine and higher in UAI than their 
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unnamed counterparts. The masculine finding is not surprising because some of the behaviours associated with 
masculinity are boastfulness, confidence, and aggression—a sort of chest pounding. In addition, these findings 
expand on Sample’s (2015) earlier findings that associated masculine behaviour with attacker defacements in 
conjunction with kinetic events in the real world. Moreover, the self-identification aspect of the behaviour 
indicates aggression and bragging, both masculine traits (Hofstede et al., 2010), and no fear of retaliation 
(Hofstede et al., 2010; Sample, 2013).   
 
The unanticipated finding of higher UAI is interesting in that low UAI or lack of fear would seem to translate to 
a lack of concern about attribution. However, the high UAI values may indicate the attackers’ desire to ensure 
that the victim has no doubt about the source of the attack. The selection of a name with a national theme by 
high UAI groups would suggest a potential overlap with high PDI where nationalistic, patriotic behaviour is 
rewarded 
 
Another possibility might be the assumption by the attackers that they would certainly want to be known, and 
not confused with another entity. The most interesting aspect of this finding is that the high UAI years (2006–
2009) occurs outside of the high PDI years (2010, 2013–2014).  One possible explanation may lie in the lower 
UAI value findings, could reflect an attitude of not caring about being discovered.  In the cases where the values 
were high UAI, the attackers might be daring the victims to respond. Of note, Hofstede et al., (2010) had 
observed the existence of a relationship between high PDI and high UAI values.  However, since the high UAI 
values do not occur at the same time as the high PDI values.  In fact, the trend showed a weak increase in PDI 
and a strong decrease in UAI values, thus, suggesting the decrease may indeed reflect the attacker not caring 
about being discovered. 
 
The strong negative correlation with low UAI reflects the low UAI in the early years (2005–2009) and the 
movement toward the centre in the later years (2010–2014). The early adopters being low UAI was consistent 
with Sanchez-Franco et al. (2008), and may reflect a sense of adventurism by the early self-identified hackers. 
The moderating trend toward lower UAI values, may also reflect the fact that web defacements are widely 
considered a less prestigious target, when compared to mail servers, databases and embedded devices (CITE). 
 
The other reason the researchers found this finding surprising was based on the lack of findings in the UAI 
dimension in previous shorter duration studies (Sample, 2013, 2015; Sample and Karamanian, 2014, 2015). The 
trend analysis findings in some dimensions showed a moderation of the attackers. The weak positive PDI 
correlation was not surprising because these types of attackers tend toward high PDI (Sample, 2013, 2015; 
Sample and Karamanian, 2014).   
 
Moreover, the lack of creativity in name selection suggests possible creativity issues in other areas. The lack of 
creativity in the name choice is not surprising because Hofstede associates creativity with curiosity found in low 
UAI and individualism.  Countries with low UAI values along with individualist societies tend to associate with 
higher creativity values (Hofstede et al., 2010).   This may be due to the fact that low UAI societies teach students 
that more than problems can have more than one correct answer, while high UAI societies, teach students that 
only one correct answer can appear for a problem.  Thus, when naming themselves after the country, a group 
of attackers (or a single attacker) from a high UAI country may perceive that name choices are limited and must 
follow a certain script, a behaviour that associates with both high UAI and high PDI values.  
 
Hofstede et al. (2010) suggested the existence of a moderating effect on creativity by collectivist groups. Other 
studies have indeed shown an inverse relationship or a moderating effect of collectivism on creativity (Niu and 
Sternberg, 2001; Bornstein, Kugler, and Zieglemeyer, 2003; Yu and Yang, 2009). 
 
The IvR movement toward more restrained or closed societies echoes the findings by the Sample (2015) study. 
The trend suggests that political, patriotic defacement is an acceptable form of expression in closed societies as 
is self-identification for the country. In this case, the names may have less to do with creativity than identification 
as being in conformance. By identifying with the country, the attackers are not singling themselves out for glory; 
any spoils are given to the society or country. Although this behaviour is typically associated with high power 
distance and collectivism, the association with restraint suggests that the name choice may allow the group to 
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The strong correlation with collectivism is of interest because this suggests “in-group” self-identification. Naming 
oneself after the country of origin is not a very creative act. However, naming may serve as a social signal 
providing insight into attacker motivation and goals, both of which are tied to cultural values. Commitment to a 
goal, motivation, is among the most important factors for successfully completing a high effort task. However, 
a multitude of goal theories do not explicitly incorporate cultural values (Locke and Latham, 2002; Rozin, 2003). 
A better understanding of the cultural and non-cultural factors for attacks may aid in reducing the effectiveness 
of the attackers.  
6. Conclusion 
All of these findings infer that the relationship between culture and cyber behaviours and choices is considerably 
stronger than previous studies have considered. This supports the findings by Henrich et al. (2012) along with 
the Nisbett (2010), Minkov (2013), and Hofstede et al. (2010) observations that cognition in general is influenced 
by culture. Cognition in cyberspace, much like in the physical world, also seems to be culturally influenced. This 
current study adds to the growing body of knowledge (Sample, 2013, 2015; Sample and Karamanian, 2014, 2015) 
by showing an evolution of sorts from the early work by Woo, Kim, and Dominick (2004). 
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